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LAW, ETHICS, AND INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE
LEE C. BUCHHEIT*
I
INTRODUCTION
Cross-border financial flows can have dramatic effects on the recipients of
the money—for good or for ill. This is particularly true in countries whose
economies and capital markets are underdeveloped. A relatively small inflow of
foreign capital into such a country can inflate valuations on a local stock
exchange or allow the government to distribute pre-election largesse in the
form of subsidies, tax breaks, spending on public works projects, and so forth. A
sudden outflow of that capital, however, can have disagreeable consequences of
an equal and opposite magnitude.
Ethical questions about who should receive cross-border financing, in what
amounts, for what purposes, and on what conditions have long engaged the
attention of international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, and the regional development banks. There may
even still be a few commercial lenders holding to the view that a private creditor
should concern itself solely with the profitability of a transaction and the
likelihood that the debt will be repaid, to the exclusion of all other ancillary
issues, but these probably constitute a dwindling minority. Like it or not, loans
that are susceptible to challenge on grounds of illegitimacy or recklessness run a
higher risk of non-payment. So, whether viewed under the light of ethics–
morality or profit-loss, the issues cannot be avoided.
What, if anything, does the law add to this discussion of ethics and
international finance? The law and the machinery of justice are certainly
ubiquitous elements in the lending process. After all, cross-border credits are
invariably evidenced by contracts of one kind or another that contemplate
enforcement in a national court.

Copyright © 2007 by Lee C. Buchheit.
This Article is also available at http://law.duke.edu/journals/lcp.
* Lee C. Buchheit is a partner in Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP based in the New York
office. He received a Juris Doctor degree from the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 1975 and
a Diploma in International Law from Cambridge University in 1976. He has served as an adjunct
professor at the School for International and Public Affairs of Columbia University, as a visiting
professor at Chuo University in Japan, as a Lecturer on Law at the Harvard Law School, as a Visiting
Lecturer in Law at the Yale Law School, and as an adjunct professor of law at Duke University School
of Law.

01__BUCHHEIT.DOC

2

12/6/2007 8:57:08 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 70:1

Specifically, are the ethical considerations raised by cross-border loans
exclusively matters to be taken into account before the credits are extended, or
are they also relevant to the interpretation and enforcement of the legal
agreements that eventually evidence the credits?
II
THE RULES
Parties entering into a commercial contract want predictability in its
interpretation and enforcement. The outcome produced by the application of
the governing law in any particular dispute may be far less important to the
parties than the fact that the outcome can be anticipated in advance of signing
the contract. Why? Because if the predictable outcome is commercially
unacceptable to one or both of the parties, they are free—before they have
signed the agreement—to adjust its terms to avoid that result, to switch the
chosen governing law if a switch solves the problem, or, as a final resort, to
scrap the deal altogether. But what commercial parties find intolerable is the
prospect of locking themselves into a contractual arrangement that may
subsequently be interpreted or enforced in a manner inconsistent with their
presigning intentions.
The ability of a legal regime to deliver a predictable outcome is one of the
major reasons why contractual counterparties will choose that regime as the
governing law of their contract. This is particularly true in the context of
financial transactions. Most lending arrangements involve starkly asymmetrical
performance by the parties: the lender’s obligations are heavily front-loaded
(they lend the money), while most of the borrower’s obligations are performed
thereafter (they must pay the money back over time). In asymmetrical contracts
of this type, the party that must perform first—here, the lender—has an
especially keen interest in knowing that it can enforce the subsequent
performance of its counterparty or obtain an award of fully compensatory
damages if that performance is not forthcoming.
Common-law legal systems, with the importance they attach to judicial
precedents, have a natural advantage in this regard. The accumulated weight of
those precedents both presage and constrain how the judiciary will interpret the
provisions of commercial agreements. Judges in these systems are not free to
reach wholly imaginative or idiosyncratic conclusions about what contractual
provisions mean or how they should be enforced.
III
THE EMOLLIENTS
But even in the strictest common-law systems, this goal of sharp
predictability is padded at the edges to safeguard against results that would
strike most people as unfair or unjust. Over the centuries, Anglo American
jurisprudence has leavened the application of the rules governing the strict
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enforcement of contracts with doctrines that permit judges to reach decisions
comporting with their sense of fairness and equity in the circumstances of a
particular case. Giving the judiciary this maneuvering room obviously injects a
degree of subjectivity into the decisionmaking process. To put it bluntly, the
more a legal system tolerates emollient doctrines of this kind in its contract law,
the less confident parties can be that their agreement will be interpreted and
enforced by Judge Jones in Courtroom 101 in precisely the same way as it
would have been by Judge Brown in the adjoining Courtroom 102. This
fundamental tension has long been visible in the development of Anglo
American contract law. A strong desire for predictable interpretation and
enforcement of commercial agreements has been balanced against a recognition
that judges should not be forced by an unyielding set of rules to hand down
judgments that are repugnant to a sense of fairness and justice.
This tension propelled, for example, the growth of the courts of equity and
equity jurisprudence in England during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
The common law as it then existed may have produced predictable results, but
it was increasingly perceived as ossified, inadequate in the remedies that it
offered injured litigants, and frequently unfair in its harshness and rigidity. The
result? A parallel system of courts, the chancery courts, dispensing equitable
relief in a more flexible manner, came into existence. As part of this equity
jurisprudence, judges were free to entertain excuses for the non-performance of
contracts under doctrines such as undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation,
mistake, impossibility or impracticability of performance, unclean hands, laches,
and so forth.
The ability of American judges to widen their peripheral vision in contract
cases to take into account the circumstances surrounding a contract, and not
just its black letter, was significantly boosted in the twentieth century by the
recognition of doctrines such as “unconscionable” contracts and the “good faith
and fair dealing” obligations imposed on all parties to a contract. These
concepts are deliberately imprecise. But they invite judges to weigh factors in
judicial decisionmaking that might, in other contexts, be described as ethical,
moral, or equitable in nature.
And finally there is the bankruptcy court—that place where any contract
can be suspended, modified, or abrogated as necessary to give a debtor a shot at
rehabilitation. Bankruptcy is thus the ultimate emollient. This too was a product
of the twentieth century. The type of bankruptcy proceeding now referred to in
the United States as Chapter 11 for corporate debtors was only introduced in
the 1930s and has gradually been refined through several legislative
amendments over the intervening years.
IV
WHAT MAKES INTERNATIONAL FINANCE DIFFERENT?
If the development of contract law has gradually accommodated the
introduction of features and institutions like bankruptcy that soften the
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application of rigid interpretative rules and admit ethical and equitable
considerations into the judicial decisionmaking process, why should crossborder financial contracts be viewed any differently from purely domestic
financial contracts? In other words, what justification can there be for
expanding or reinterpreting the conventional emollients in a cross-border
context?
There are several reasons, among them the absence of a global bankruptcy
regime, the convention that successor sovereigns assume the debts of their
predecessors, and the restricted reach of judicial remedies.
A. No Bankruptcy Regime
First and foremost is the absence of anything resembling a Chapter 11
rehabilitation process for sovereign debtors and, in many countries, a fair and
workable bankruptcy procedure for corporate debtors. The significance of
Chapter 11 (and its counterparts elsewhere) cannot be overstated in its
influence upon the behavior of contractual counterparties. That significance
goes far beyond just the cases that actually wind up in Chapter 11.
The very existence of a Chapter 11 alternative—unpleasant as it is for both
corporate debtors and their creditors—is a brooding shadow over all corporate
debt workouts. It compels a degree of moderation, sobriety, and restraint on
both sides. If either side comes to believe that its position in an out-of-court
workout will be materially worse than its fate in a Chapter 11 proceeding, it will
put the problem into the hands of the bankruptcy court.
This moderating influence is frequently absent in cross-border financial
disputes. Sovereign debtors completely lack this element of leverage over their
creditors. There is no bankruptcy regime for a sovereign borrower. Sovereigns
are uniquely vulnerable to hostile creditor legal actions; there is no possibility of
an “automatic stay” of such actions, much less an involuntary “cram down” of a
plan of reorganization.
In the corporate context, the shoe is often on the other foot. A corporate
debtor located in a jurisdiction that lacks a fair and functioning bankruptcy
regime has more leverage over its creditors than does its U.S.-based
counterpart. Putting a corporate debtor into involuntary bankruptcy in such a
country is frequently so appalling a prospect for the creditor that any negotiated
workout is preferable to the bankruptcy option.
B. Public International Law
Cross-border financial contracts can sometimes be affected by public
international legal principles that have no correlatives in municipal law. The
best example is the public international law doctrine of state or governmental
succession to debt obligations incurred by prior regimes in the debtor country.
It is a strict doctrine around which few emollient principles have ever coalesced.
For example, interpreted strictly—and it usually is interpreted strictly—this
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doctrine forces sovereign borrowers to assume the responsibility for debts
incurred by former despots for their own personal use.
C. Limited Scope of Judicial Remedies
Private parties usually have little choice but to submit their cross-border
financial contracts, even with sovereign borrowers, to the municipal laws and
the municipal courts of one country or another. There is no truly international
law of contracts and no transnational judicial body to adjudicate contract
disputes. The remedies available to a judge sitting in such a municipal court,
however, are limited and parochial. The cause of action is money due but not
paid on a debt instrument. The remedy is typically an award of monetary
damages.
Even when the cause of the debtor’s default is a catastrophic collapse of the
economy in the debtor country, sometimes resulting from natural disasters or
shifts in international trading patterns, a municipal court will have little room to
take these factors into account in handing down a judgment. Doctrines of
impossibility or impracticability of performance, particularly in cases involving
borrowed money, are interpreted very strictly. The circumstances giving rise to
the defense must not have been foreseeable by the parties at the time they
signed the deal.
So we have a system in which the remedies available in municipal law for
the breach of a cross-border debt contract, while perhaps adequate for a one-off
situation, are wholly inadequate to deal with a generalized debt crisis in a
foreign country. Municipal courts are typically forbidden from looking into the
underlying causes of the default, nor are they competent to issue orders that can
direct the behavior of both creditors and debtors toward a broader resolution of
the crisis. That authority, in a domestic corporate context, would have been
exercised by a bankruptcy court. It is like equipping a physician with an
inexhaustible supply of three-inch bandages, and then sending her off to the
scene of the crash of a commercial jet airplane.
V
CONCLUSION
The evolution of Anglo American contract law has thus been shaped by a
desire for clear, predictable rules of contract interpretation and enforcement,
on the one side, and a perceived need for emollient doctrines or institutions by
which considerations of fairness, reasonableness, and equity are admitted into
the judicial decisionmaking process, on the other.
Whatever one’s views about whether this balance has been struck
appropriately in a purely domestic context, debtor–creditor relationships in a
cross-border setting are played out against a different factual and legal
backdrop. It is therefore legitimate to ask whether the balance should be
reassessed in this different environment.

01__BUCHHEIT.DOC

6

12/6/2007 8:57:08 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 70:1

The articles in this volume analyze a difficult area where law and ethics have
not yet found a happy coexistence—the problem of odious debts. The law
requires successor governments to honor the obligations incurred by their
predecessors, with very few exceptions. Morality and fairness, however, balk at
the idea of forcing the citizens of a country to repay debts that may have only
benefited a kleptomaniacal former dictator. The trick, of course, is finding a
way to relax the strict legal rule to avoid the morally repugnant result, without
abandoning altogether the principle that sovereign-debt contracts are intended
to be legally binding undertakings.

